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In 1986, the Court of Appeal found that an application for judicial review 
could be brought in respect of a decision of the City Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers, a non-governmental or private body purportedly engaged in the 
‘self-regulation’ of certain financial activities in the City of London.  As is often 
the situation in such cases, the applicants (Datafin, a vehicle formed by 
managers of a printing company trying to buy it in competition with another 
company seeking to merge with it) failed on the substantive question (and 
the company they failed to buy went through a series of subsequent mergers 
and demergers), but remain famous - at least in the minds of lawyers and 
scholars, not to mention the revision notebooks of administrative law 
students.  
 
The Datafin case1 has been followed by a series of further cases where the 
question of amenability (primarily a matter for the common law) has arisen, 
though in general they can be said to be applications of Datafin principles 
rather than any significant reconsideration of its findings.  In the absence of 
statutory control, Datafin and its children (and the bare reference in CPR Part 
54 to judicial review being a claim regarding “a decision, action or failure to 
act in relation to the exercise of a public function”)2 determine whether a 
particular body, or a particular function of a body, is subject to judicial review.  
Thus, it is possible (on the authority of the first flurry of post-Datafin cases) 
to seek judicial review of a decision of the Advertising Standards Authority,3 
but not of the Jockey Club (the Aga Khan case)4 (where the contractual 
relationship between the Jockey Club and the owners affected by its decisions 
was important) or the Football Association.5  Indeed, the relatively clear 
decision in the Aga Khan case did not dissuade an applicant from seeking a 
review of the decision of the Appeal Board of the Jockey Club, unsuccessfully 
advancing various innovative grounds such as the absence of a direct contract 
between himself and the Appeal Board.6 
 
                                        
1
 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815. 
2
 Note that the current Rules are written to include the HRA action discussed below; the 
former provision (RSC Order 53) was essentially silent on the matter. 
3
 R v Advertising Standards Authority ex parte The Insurance Service (1990) 2 Admin LR 77. 
Examples of subsequent cases include R v Advertising Standards Authority ex parte Charles 
Robertson (Developments) [2000] EMLR 463 and R (Debt Free Direct) v Advertising 
Standards Authority [2007] EWHC 1337 (Admin), both applications being unsuccessful. 
4
 Though note that it is possible to challenge Jockey Club decisions through the indirect 
routes of claims based on contract and restraint of trade: Williams v Jockey Club [2004] 
EWHC 2164 (QB). 
5
 R v Football Association ex parte Football League [1993] 2 All ER 833. 
6
 R (Mullins) v Appeal Board of the Jockey Club [2005] EWHC 2197 (Admin). 
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Legacy and relevance of Datafin 
 
Other recent cases have dealt with the British Council’s ‘purely voluntary’ 
registration scheme for EFL schools7 and a series of issues pertaining to 
Lloyd’s of London,8 and it has been made clear again and again that there are 
limits to judicial review of the private law actions of public authorities.9  Not 
all issues have been resolved, though: for example, it is still unclear whether 
the Press Complaints Commission is subject to judicial review, with the point 
being sidelined in a number of cases due to the Commission’s reservation of 
its position on this point and the Court’s acceptance of such.10 
Datafin is broadly accepted in other common-law jurisdictions, although there 
have been some isolated attempts to expand its scope.  In a 2005 New 
Zealand decision, it was found that a private (but free-to-air) television 
network was amendable to judicial review in respect of its decision to bar a 
party from a pre-election debate.11 
 
Datafin is of continuing interest for a number of reasons.  For its time, it was 
a useful expansion of the scope of administrative law, allowing a limited set of 
powerful bodies outside the traditional public law paradigm to be held to 
account before independent judges where the circumstances demanded, 
despite being in many regards characterised as private bodies.  The decision 
in Datafin was reached during a decade when customers of nationalised 
industries were told to ‘See Sid’ if they wanted to become shareholders in 
privatized industries instead and when former Prime Minister Thatcher 
suggested that there is such thing as society, but there have been further 
examples in subsequent years of the blurring of the line between purely 
public and purely private, continuing (and in some sectors intensifying) 
despite a change of government when the Conservatives were replaced in 
government by Labour after the 1997 election. 
 
Today, there is renewed interest in financial regulation, and the idea of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer paying tribute to light-touch regulation12 is, after 
the events of the past year, quite preposterous.  On the other hand, self-
regulation retains its allure in some sectors (particularly media and 
communications), as it neatly side-steps complaints of State interference and 
keeps the costs of regulation off the public books, and although there have 
been a number of situations where public-private partnerships have been 
scaled back, the pursuit of private-sector and third-sector delivery has not yet 
slowed down in any significant way.   
                                        
7
 R (Oxford Study Centre) v British Council [2001] All ER (D) 213 (Mar). 
8
 R (West) v Lloyd’s of London [2004] EWCA Civ 506. 
9
 E.g. R (Evans) v University of Cambridge [2002] All ER (D) 86 (Jul). 
10
 R (Ford) v Press Complaints Commission [2001] EWHC Admin 683; R v Press Complaints 
Commission ex parte Stewart-Brady (1996) 9 Admin LR 274, [1997] EMLR 185. 
11
 Dunne v Canwest [2005] NZAR 577; see further J Wilson, 'Judicial Review and Editorial 
Freedom' (2006) 12 Auckland U L Rev 199.  
12
 See for example ‘Chancellor launches Better Regulation action plan’ (24 May 2005) 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/better_regulation_action_plan.htm. 
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Perhaps most notably, though, the position after Datafin looks very different 
to that of today when the purposes of defining a body as exercising a public 
function are considered.  In 1986, the possibility of applying for judicial 
review was the primary purpose for seeking such a designation.  Since 1998, 
though, there is the additional element of the remedy provided by the Human 
Rights Act, which prohibits ‘public authorities’ from acting in a way that 
violates the Convention rights of a ‘victim’.  Simultaneously, a range of 
statutes have extended broad duties to bodies of various sorts, under 
headings such as freedom of information and equality.  It is therefore thought 
necessary, and is the purpose of this paper, to consider these matters 
alongside Datafin, in order to ascertain the true state of the law on public 
authorities and public functions, and therefore assess what constraints, if any, 
apply to self-regulatory and co-regulatory bodies in public law. 
 
The Human Rights Act 
 
Section 6: functions of a public nature 
 
By the time that the Human Rights Bill was introduced in Parliament, the 
legacy of Datafin was still unclear, and there was some anxiety, including on 
the part of the legislators introducing the Bill, that greater clarity on the 
application of human rights law was necessary.13  Therefore, it was necessary 
to set out – in the text of the legislation – against which parties the new 
domestic remedy for breach of Convention rights would be available.  This is 
achieved through section 6 of the Act: 
 
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if—  
(a) as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority could 
not have acted differently; or  
(b) in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which 
cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights, the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions.  
(3) In this section “public authority” includes—  
(a) a court or tribunal, and  
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature,  
but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in 
connection with proceedings in Parliament. 
(4) In subsection (3) “Parliament” does not include the House of Lords in its judicial 
capacity.  
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of 
subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private.  
(6) “An act” includes a failure to act but does not include a failure to—  
(a) introduce in, or lay before, Parliament a proposal for legislation; or  
                                        
13
 See for example the debate on clause 6 in the House of Commons: Hansard HC vol 314 
cols 404-418 (17 June 1998). 
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(b) make any primary legislation or remedial order. 
 
The Act does not define what is a public authority.  Instead, it includes the 
persons certain of whose functions are of a public nature within the group of 
authorities that are public authorities, but restricts the application of that 
definition through subsection (5).  The Lord Chancellor explained in debate in 
the House of Lords that a body which has “any functions of a public nature … 
qualifies as a public authority”, though not all acts of such a body would be 
subject to the Act, and that it would not be appropriate to list all such bodies 
in the Act.14  It was surely inevitable, though, that in a climate of contracting 
out, deregulation, diverse provision, privatisation and other similar 
developments, this definition would not be the subject of further discussion 
and elaboration.  At a relatively early stage, the courts were able to develop 
an appropriate nomenclature (as in Aston Cantlow),15 distinct from the 
Datafin doctrines but interesting in that it set up a division not clearly 
expressed in the statute.  This is the divide between ‘core’ and ‘hybrid’ public 
authorities: core public authorities (not defined, but including courts and 
tribunals) are public authorities with respect to all of their functions, while 
hybrid public authorities (i.e. those captured by s 6(3)(b) but exempted in 
part by s 5(5)) see some acts (or functions?) subject to the HRA and others 
(i.e. private acts) not so subject.   
 
YL16 is the definitive decision of the House of Lords decision (for now) on this 
point.  The local authority had a duty under the National Assistance Act 1948 
to make arrangements for the care of elderly residents, which in this case was 
provided by a private company (Southern Cross) which ran nursing homes 
catering for both ‘public’ and ‘private’ residents.  A ‘public’ resident wished to 
challenge her removal from the nursing home on Article 8 grounds.  In the 
House of Lords, the Government intervened, on the side of the resident.  It 
was found that the actions of the private company are not captured by 
section 6; it had earlier been found (pre-HRA) that similar bodies would not 
be amenable to judicial review.17  Generally, the case limits the ability of 
affected individuals to challenge decisions of bodies acting under contract 
with local authorities.18 
 
Responding to YL: general approach 
 
One feature of the debate on public authorities and the Human Rights Act is 
the consistent and determined advocacy of the broad approach taken by the 
                                        
14
 Hansard HL vol 583 col 796 (24 November 1997). 
15
 Parochial Church Council of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley v Wallbank [2003] 
UKHL 37. 
16
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27. 
17
 R v Servite Houses ex parte Goldsmith (2000) LGLR 997, 2000 WL 571362 (QBD). 
18
 It has been suggested (perhaps with tongue in cheek) that a future resident wishing to bring 
an Article 8 claim should instead remain until physically evicted, and then advance a 
horizontal effect claim under the common law on battery: A Williams, 'YL v Birmingham City 
Council: contracting out and "functions of a public nature"' [2008] EHRLR 524. 
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Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), causing it to depart quite 
significantly from Government policy on a number of occasions.  In the time 
between the YL decisions at the Court of Appeal and House of Lords, the 
JCHR put forward a proposal (based on its earlier, detailed report on the 
subject)19 to intervene (through a standalone Act), as follows: 
 
For the purposes of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42), a function 
of a public nature includes a function performed pursuant to a contract or other 
arrangement with a public authority which is under a duty to perform that function. 
 
However, this Bill, introduced in Private Members’ Time in the 06-07 session 
by the chair of the committee (Andrew Dismore MP), was not proceeded with, 
on the grounds that it was more appropriate to await the decision of the 
House of Lords in YL.  
 
A second attempt (with a revised text) was introduced in the following 
parliamentary session (07-08), but did not receive parliamentary time and fell 
at the end of the session.  This Bill would have set out mandatory factors to 
be taken into account when assessing a function 
 
(a) the extent to which the state has assumed responsibility for the function in 
question;  
(b) the role and responsibility of the state in relation to the subject matter in 
question;   
(c) the nature and extent of the public interest in the function in question; 
(d) the nature and extent of any statutory power or duty in relation to the function in 
question;  
(e) the extent to which the state, directly or indirectly, regulates, supervises or 
inspects the performance of the function in question; 
(f) the extent to which the state makes payment for the function in question; 
(g)  whether the function involves or may involve the use of statutory coercive 
powers;  
(h) the extent of the risk that improper performance of the function might violate an 
individual's Convention right. 
 
It would also provide that a function of a public nature would include 
functions required or enabled to be performed wholly or partially at public 
expense, without regard to the legal status of the person performing the 
function or whether there was a contract in place.  At first glance, this does 
seem to be rather broad, potentially capturing any activities carried out with 
assistance from public funds (through ‘functions … enabled … partially at 
public expense’), and would seem to contradict the more purposive approach 
of the seven mandatory factors. 
 
The Government initially approached the situation through publishing 
guidance for local authorities on 'contracting in the light of the Human Rights 
Act.’   Proponents of the new Bill, though, argue that this approach was a 
failure, being poorly written, lacking in practical examples and failing to be 
                                        
19
 Joint Committee of Human Rights, ‘The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human 
Rights Act’ HC (2006-7) 410 / HL (2006-7) 77. 
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properly communicated to local authorities.20 It has also been suggested that 
the matter would be addressed in the forthcoming consultation process on 
the British Bill of Rights and Duties.  A Bill with this title has been presented 
as a Private Member’s Bill in the current session.21 
 
Responses to YL 
 
If the JCHR proposal is not to pass, is there then a case-by-case solution?  
The recently-enacted Health and Social Care Act 2008 provides at s 145(1): 
 
A person (“P”) who provides accommodation, together with nursing or personal care, 
in a care home for an individual under arrangements made with P under the relevant 
statutory provisions [various, including ss.21(1)(a) and 26 of the NA Act] is to be 
taken for the purposes of [6(3)(b)] to be exercising a function of a public nature in 
doing so. 
 
According to the explanatory note, this is consistent with what is said to be 
the Government’s original intention in the HRA: to include private care homes 
providing services to an individual pursuant to a contract with a local 
authority.  In effect, then, it reverses the result of YL, but not the legal 
reasoning or the impact on other bodies potentially performing a public 
function (but on behalf of or pursuant to an agreement with, say, a council) 
and those who would seek to enforce Convention rights against them.  
Groups concerned with the rights of the elderly (e.g. Age Concern, Help the 
Aged) as well as civil liberties groups (Justice, Liberty) campaigned in favour 
of this clause,22 and introducing the clause in the House of Lords, Baroness 
Thornton restated the Government’s objection to the result in YL but agreed 
that a sector-by-sector approach would not be appropriate.23  It is interesting 
to review the debate on this clause, where the only objections came from 
peers arguing that the Human Rights Act should also protect private 
customers of the affected care homes.  The enactment of the provision would 
seem to put the issue of HRA compliance by private facilities with respect to 
publicly-funded residents relatively beyond doubt for the time being, although 
the financial and practical impact is still being assessed by the private sector 
providers.24 
 
It is contended that this approach itself is problematic, in that it makes 
situations that would be on the boundary more susceptible to being defined 
as not engaging the HRA, due to the lack of an affirmative statement.  
Depending on how the legislative drafters see it, unless Baroness Thornton’s 
words persuade all parties not to pursue this approach (which does depend 
                                        
20
 Hansard HC vol 469 col 740 (18 December 2007) (Andrew Dismore). 
21
 Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning Of Public Authority) Bill 2008-09. 
22
 Press release (20 May 2008), http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/ 
joint%20press%20release%20hsc%20amendment%2020.5.08.pdf. 
23
 Hansard HL vol 701 col GC631Lords (22 May 2008). 
24
 L James, ‘Taking responsibility for human rights: a gap in the law?’ (2008) 3(1) J of Care 
Services Management 83, 94-5. 
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on a general resolution of the question), providing a textual guarantee of HRA 
enforcement will either become a pro forma statement added to a range of 
Bills, or the source of tension and negotiation each time.  It also does not 
solve the question of existing legislation, of which there is an awful lot: bear 
in mind that the general legislation conferring power on local authorities in 
respect of housing and social assistance may in fact be from the first years of 
the modern welfare state, despite modern reforms.  Courts could well point to 
an express inclusion of the clause in one Act (or its rejection in debate in 
another) as creating a strong presumption against finding that a function was 
captured by section 6.  On the other hand, in a US context, even an explicit 
statutory statement that seemed to define a body (Amtrak) as private (“will 
not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government”) was 
disregarded by the Supreme Court for the purposes of an ultimately 
unsuccessful First Amendment challenge.25 
 
Unsurprisingly, we did not have to wait for long before there was a demand 
for another specific clause, and it came in an area that had already been the 
subject of legal proceedings.  During the parliamentary debates on what 
became the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, an amendment was 
introduced that would not only have made (private) residential social 
landlords (RSLs) public authorities for the purposes of section 6, but also 
‘amenable to judicial review by the Administrative Court’.  This amendment – 
not particularly carefully drafted – would have gone much further than was 
required to address the criticised elements of the caselaw.  For example, it 
would probably have defined the relevant bodies as what the courts consider 
core public authorities.  It was therefore not extremely difficult for the 
Government to oppose the clause,26 although the Government’s own 
reasoning is also open to criticism.  It was put to Parliament that that ‘social 
housing is not a public service which has been recently privatised, it is a 
regulated voluntary activity which local authorities become involved in’27 
(which, if true, should surely apply to nursing homes on the same basis), that 
compliance would be expensive (a reasonable, although philosophically 
controversial one), and that the provision would prevent RSLs from borrowing 
money, as they would be considered to be public bodies for Treasury 
monitoring purposes.  The JCHR rightly criticized the last of these points as 
wholly unproven, pointing to the lack of any examples of such a ruling, and 
pointing to a written confirmation from the then Secretary of State for 
Constitutional Affairs that status as a hybrid public authority did not affect the 
classification of borrowing as public or private.28 
 
                                        
25
 Lebron v National Railroad Passenger Corporation (1995) 513 US 374; substantive claim 
unsuccessful (1995) 69 F 3d 650 (2nd Circuit CA). 
26
 Hansard HL vol 702 col GC228 (11 June 2008). 
27
 Hansard HL vol 702 col GC230 (11 June 2008). 
28
 Written Evidence 3 (Memorandum from the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and 
Lord Chancellor) in Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Meaning of Public Authority 
under the Human Rights Act’ HC (2003-4) 382 / HL (2003-4) 39. 
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Despite these great efforts, which led to the defeat of the various 
amendments, the High Court subsequently found in R (Weaver) v London & 
Quadrant Housing Trust29 that, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, a 
RSL was a hybrid public authority.  The claim against the RSL, brought with 
the support of legal aid (as it is a test case on public functions!) was based on 
legitimate expectation (i.e. a non-HRA public law claim requiring a Datafin-
style determination) as well as the Article 8 issues.  Richards LJ (with Swift J) 
found that YL did not overrule the earlier Poplar decision;30 that the RSL was 
a non-profit charity, lacking the private and commercial features of Southern 
Cross in YL; that the sector (social rented housing) is not just regulated but 
‘permeated by state control and influence with a view to meeting the 
Government's aims for affordable housing’ and ‘in a very real sense [can] be 
said to take the place of, local authorities’31 that the sector is heavily 
subsidised; and that it has a duty to co-operate with local authorities.   
 
This case, although the most recent word on the subject, does appear to 
stand relatively alone, and must be approached with some care.32  Elsewhere, 
aside from the various cases that culminated with the decision in YL, various 
Human Rights Act claims against bodies have been dismissed for lack of a 
public function under section 6: against a parochial council (Aston Cantlow), 
against Network Rail on the grounds that it ‘was not, and therefore was not 
acting as, a public authority’, although it may have been so (albeit a hybrid 
one) before amendments to the system of rail regulation in the UK,33 and 
against Lloyd’s of London.34  
 
Judicial review and section 6 claims: the same test? 
 
In some cases, great care is taken to deal with the administrative law and 
human rights claims separately (e.g in the most recent Lloyd’s case).35  In the 
Northern Irish case of Wylie,36 the difference was restated: “The public law 
concept in judicial review is not identical to the public authority concept under 
the 1998 Act but they occupy some common ground”.  In YL, they were again 
not equated, although it is argued by Palmer that a point of departure 
between the majority and minority of the Court was the reliance by the 
                                        
29
 [2008] EWHC 1377 (Admin). 
30
 In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association v Donoghue [2001] EWCA 
595 (Civ), an RSL was found to be subject to the Human Rights Act; the question in Weaver 
was whether this was disturbed by YL. 
31
 Weaver [55]. 
32
 For discussion of the decision in Weaver, see R Latham & S Reeder, ‘An old chestnut’ 
(2008) 158 NLJ 1484; A Arden, ‘A swing of the pendulum’ (2008) 11 J of Housing L 75. 
33
 Cameron v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 1133 (QB) [37]. 
34
 R (West) v Lloyd’s of London [39]. 
35
 R (West) v Lloyd’s of London. 
36
 Re Wylie [2005] NIQB 2. 
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majority on Datafin and subsequent cases to give a narrow reading to section 
6.37 
On one hand, an argument based on section 6 of the HRA was the subject of 
some criticism in the (non-HRA) case of R v Association of British Travel 
Agents ex parte Sunspell,38 rejected by Keene J (setting aside a grant of 
permission to apply for review) as “a classic one of trying to haul oneself 
uphill by one’s bootstraps”, and it was suggested (but not determined) in the 
same case that there would be situations where a body would come within 
the scope of the HRA but not conventional public law actions.  In Aston 
Cantlow, the House of Lords was sceptical of the value of the authorities on 
public authority based on judicial review.39  On the other hand, an equally 
forceful case is made by Burnton J in Mullins for a merging of the two 
approaches, at least on the basis of the new procedures:  
 
For the reasons I have given, in relation to hybrid authorities, I believe that [CPR Part 
54.1] as introduced on that date was intended to apply to the same acts as those 
that are treated as those of a public authority by virtue of section 6(3)(b) and (5) 
[HRA]. This interpretation avoids different meanings be given to similar phrases in 
the same context. It means that the question whether a particular act of a hybrid 
authority was done in the exercise of a public function will receive the same answer 
under section 6 and under Part 54.1. It means that Part 54.1, like section 6, falls to 
be interpreted by taking into account the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. I think that these results are sensible and desirable.40  
 
In Weaver it was put to the court that defining bodies as subject to HRA 
obligations is based on amenability to judicial review; the point was  not 
addressed, but Richards LJ commented that “it would be strange if a function 
had a public character sufficient to engage the application of the 1998 Act yet 
insufficient to engage the court's normal public law jurisdiction”.41  It can be 
said that there is a significant division of opinion on this point. 
 
There are a number of reasons why this matters, not least the value to the 
potential applicant of knowing with some certainty whether their claim is 
going to be dismissed on what is essentially, from the court’s point of view, a 
preliminary matter.  Indeed, there are clearly a number of crucial differences 
between the two procedures in other preliminary matters.  The state of the 
law on standing is one: “sufficient interest” in the case of judicial review, 
following section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and a number of cases in 
the past 20 years that are commonly understood as giving a generous 
interpretation to the Rules as opposed to “is (or would be) a victim of the 
unlawful act”, according to section 7 HRA and Article 34 of the Convention.  
On the other hand, it is established that the types of acts that a core public 
authority must perform in accordance with the Convention are broader than 
                                        
37
 S Palmer, ‘Public, Private and the Human Rights Act 1998: An Ideological Divide’ (2007) 66 
CLJ 559, 567-8. 
38
 [2001] ACD 16, 2000 WL 1480083 (QBD) [25]. 
39
 Aston Cantlow, per Lord Nicholls [52]; Lord Hobhouse [87]. 
40
 Mullins [42]. 
41
 Weaver [64]. 
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the public law functions required for a conventional matter of judicial review.  
As I will argue below, the use of the HRA definitions in other legislation may 




The approach of the European Court of Human Rights is, as previously stated, 
based on the idea of State responsibility for particular actions.42  It is 
reaffirmed in Storck v Germany,43 where it is clear that there is a relatively 
undeveloped definition of the concept of public authorities.  This can be 
understood, though, in the light of the Court’s approach to the duties on 
courts to vindicate the Convention rights of parties and the State’s positive 
obligations, and so there has historically been only a limited need to decide 
conclusively the ambit of state bodies.  Similarly, in Costello-Roberts v UK,44 
the UK was found to be violating the applicant’s Article 3 rights by failing to 
protect him from a particular severity of corporal punishment.  The legislation 
then in force applied to publicly-funded schools but not to the independent 
sector in respect of pupils not funded through ‘assisted places’ – perhaps 
broader than even the pre-YL understanding of the scope of the Human 
Rights Act favoured by the JCHR.  This approach of course varies from right 
to right, given the state of the law on positive obligations under the 
Convention. 
 
Under EU law, there is a slightly different approach: for example, direct effect 
applies to a body “whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, 
pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service 
under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers 
beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations 
between individuals”.45  Given the relatively few cases where the principle is 
directly engaged, though, this is a doctrine that has not developed in any 
great detail.  Some UK opinions on public authorities have touched on aspects 
of EU law but not found them to be of particular use.46 
 
Public authorities and specialised statutes 
 
Importance of other provisions 
 
Despite the litres of ink spilled and bits consumed by the literature on Datafin 
and then on the HRA cases, there is a third, less familiar ‘category’ of legal 
                                        
42
 See further Williams (n 18) 526; H Quane, ‘The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning 
of a "public authority" under the Human Rights Act’ [2006] PL 106. 
43
 (2005) 43 EHRR 96. 
44
 (1993) 19 EHRR 112. 
45
 Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313 [20]. 
46
 Aston Cantlow [53]-[55], Weaver [47]. 
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material on public authorities, that of specific statutes requiring public 
authorities to act in a particular way.  Examples include legislation on equality 
and discrimination, on the use of Welsh and Gaelic in their respective 
hinterlands, and the main example discussed here, the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000.  While the availability of remedies under judicial review 
and the HRA are likely to be of value to the individual in many situations, it is 
clear that Parliament recognises the importance of other approaches to 
regulating the behaviour of public authorities.  Therefore, a particular body’s 
status in terms of possible causes of action in the courts is certainly not the 
only game in town.  In the same way, though, as the affected citizen has a 
genuine interest in whether a particular body can be held to account through 
judicial review or human rights law, the same person should pay attention to 
whether the same body is included within the scope of these statutes.  It is 
contended in this section that the answer to such a question is not much 
clearer than it was for the established issues of review and rights, and that 
significant gaps in the protection of the individual may be emerging. 
 
Freedom of information 
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act, records can be requested from 
particular bodies.  There are three categories: 
• Bodies listed or described in Schedule 1 (as amended) 
• Bodies wholly owned by a public authority (automatically covered) 
• Bodies designed pursuant to section 5 of the Act (to the extent so 
designated), that exercise functions of a public nature or are carrying 
out the functions of a public authority under contract 
 
The list of bodies and types of bodies in Schedule 1 is lengthy, and has been 
already been amended by 91 separate Acts (so far),47 usually by other 
legislation.  Typically, a new body is created and the same legislation inserts it 
into Schedule 1 of the Act; under the Act, the Schedule can also be amended 
by statutory instrument, and there have been eight such orders to date.  Such 
bodies must be established and appointed by Crown, legislative or executive 
action. In the case of companies wholly owned by a public authority, no 
action is necessary, although a problem has arisen in that the form of words 
used in the statute, referring to a company ‘wholly owned by any public 
authority’ having ‘no members except that public authority’ means that 
companies jointly owned by two or more public bodies are (inexplicably and 
probably unintentionally) not included.48  There has also been one case of a 
removal of a body wholly owned by a public authority – the unfortunate 
Northern Rock – where the order providing for the transfer of the bank to 
public ownership ‘deemed’ it not to be subject to the Act.49 
                                        
47
 Best estimate of the author, based on Lexis, Westlaw and other searches. 
48
 Freedom of Information Act 2000, s 6.  See further Written Evidence 10 (Memorandum of 
the Information Commissioner’s Office) in Joint Committee of Human Rights (n 19). 
49
 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008; Northern Rock plc Transfer Order 2008 SI 2008/432 
art 18. 
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In the case of section 5, though, no action has been taken to date.  In late 
2007, the Ministry for Justice published a consultation paper setting out its 
provisional view with regard to the use of the section and inviting 
comments.50  Although the consultation closed in February 2008, the 
Government’s response has not yet been published.  The consultation paper 
did indicate some openness to action, suggesting that there are obvious 
disparities between similar functions (the example given was publicly-run 
prisons v privately-run prisons) and that there are issues associated with 
transparency arising from the significant sums of public money being spent 
through bodies not subject to the Act.  However, the paper also highlighted 
considerations of cost and burden, particularly in the case of charitable 
organisations. 
 
Five options were presented: take no action, encourage good behaviour 
through a code of practice, build FOI requirements into public contracts, issue 
a section 5 order, or issue a series of section 5 orders.  The final option was 
the preferred option of the public watchdog, the Information Commissioner.  
Broadly speaking (and hampered by the fact that the submissions will not be 
published until after the Government’s response is published), extension was 
opposed by business groups51 and the charitable sector,52 and favoured by 
freedom of information campaigners.  
 
If action were to be taken, though, such would still be constrained by the 
requirement that prescribed bodies be exercising functions of a public nature.  
Any listing of a body not exercising such functions could (and would) be 
challenged as ultra vires the Freedom of Information Act.  In the consultation 
paper, it is suggested that a court dealing with such a challenge would ‘be 
likely to have regard to broadly similar factors in relation to section 5 of the 
Act as they would when determining the scope of judicial review and the 
Human Rights Act 1998’.53  Section 5 itself was the subject of some internal 
discussion at the time of the Act’s passing, drawing upon the Datafin 
jurisprudence, as can be seen from documents (perhaps ironically) 
subsequently disclosed under FOI.54 
 
FOI and its discontents 
 
There are dangers to this approach too, particularly given the pace of modern 
legislation.  For example, the controversial school ‘academies’ are not subject 
                                        
50
 Consultation Paper CP 27/07 http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp2707.pdf. 
51







 CP 27/07 (n 50) [19]. 
54
 http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/freedom_of_information/Responseletterforcase12092.pdf. 
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to FOI as Schedule 1 includes ‘maintained schools within the meaning of the 
School Standards and Framework Act 1988’ and academies are not so 
categorised.  However, there is no suggestion that academies should be 
exempt for policy reasons from FOI, and this appears to have been an 
oversight.55  This illustrates one of the problems with the approach based on 
an exclusive list. 
 
The determination of what is and what is not a public authority is also a 
difficult one.  The BBC is in the relatively rare position of being defined as 
subject to the Act in respect of particular functions (or to be more precise, 
subject to the Act except in respect of particular functions).  In BBC v Sugar56 
the House of Lords, in its first decision on the Freedom of Information Act, 
held that the question of the BBC’s refusal to release information on the 
grounds that it was not subject to the Act can be appealed under the Act’s 
rules (i.e. to the Information Tribunal); the Court of Appeal below had held 
that such a decision could only be challenged through judicial review.57  It is 
worth noting in this context that the Sugar case relates to one of the few 
issues likely to lead to legal proceedings without difficulty, in that, which 
clearly is more likely to require judicial intervention than where a body is 
included or excluded without further elaboration.  Given that the method 
under section 5 will normally mean that information is subject to FOI in 
respect of particular functions, this case will certainly have an impact on the 
process of designation. 
 
It is interesting to note the types of bodies cited as suitable for bringing 
within the scope of the Act: the Information Commissioner noted that he had 
received complaints from the public about the non-inclusion of the Press 
Complaints Commission, Financial Ombudsman Service, Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors, ICSTIS/PhonepayPlus and the Financial Reporting 
Council (of the five, two relate to media and communications and two to 
finance).58  The Campaign for Freedom of Information recommended the 
inclusion of the PCC, ASA, Solicitors Regulation Authority “and other bodies 
carrying out self-regulatory functions which the government itself would 
otherwise undertake, should also be designated”.  On the other hand, it has 
been argued (by the then-Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport, 
Estelle Morris) that designation of the PCC would not be compatible with the 
Government’s policy on press freedom through self-regulation,59 despite the 
Government’s outright refusal to exempt the same body from the Human 
Rights Act.60 
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 CP 27/07 (n 50) 17. 
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 [2009] UKHL 9  
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 [2008] EWCA Civ 191.  See also H Johnson, ‘Freedom of information - confidence and 
journalism exemptions from disclosure’ (2008) 13 Communications L 174. 
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 Hansard HC vol 430 col 45W (24 January 2005). 
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 Hansard HC vol 315 col 541 (2 July 1998). 
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Cases on designation as a public authority 
 
There does appear to be some scope for challenging the status of a body as 
subject to (or not subject to) a particular statute, i.e. by challenging the 
inclusion or removal of such a body. This issue became more than a 
theoretical one in the lengthy case of R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work 
& Pensions,61 where a plethora of administrative law issues arose from a 
decision to close a post office in Sussex.  For present purposes, we are 
concerned with the decision to remove Royal Mail from the list of bodies 
required to establish a disability equality scheme under the Disability 
Discrimination Acts 1995-2005 and associated regulations.  The Secretary of 
State has the power to make regulations requiring public authorities to carry 
out specific duties.  Public authority is defined in section 49B in similar 
language to the Human Rights Act.  The relevant legal entity, the Royal Mail 
Group, was included as a public authority in the original Regulations, but 
removed by subsequent statutory instrument, following a number of requests 
from the Group.  Assertions that the regulation was made for an 
impermissible purpose and that it was irrational were rejected by the 
Administrative Court.  However, there was a strong case made that the 
purpose of the regulation was to promote competition (backed up by a 
number of Ministerial statements and the explanatory memorandum).  If this 
is not an improper purpose, it is still certainly of interest to us if interested in 
the role of public authority duties, as it serves as a timely reminder that the 
decision to exclude or include a body from a particular list of public authorities 
is open to challenge, perhaps awaiting more compelling facts.62 
 
It would be most interesting to see how a body included as a public authority 
would fare if challenging a designation of itself by way of statutory instrument 
(as opposed to Southern Cross’s argument in YL which was against a judicial 
understanding of its activities as subject to the HRA).The Irish case of Central 
Applications Office v Minister for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, 
where a decision to list a private body created by universities and other 
higher education institutions to process student applications as a public body 
for the purposes of the Official Languages Act was unsuccessful, is perhaps 
such an example.63 
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 [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin). 
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 With regard to this particular legislation, there was in fact no express provision for 
regulations defining public bodies – it was the decision of the Secretary of State to provide in 
the relevant regulations that they would apply to specified bodies that made the difference.  
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apply to all public authorities without the need for further intervention. 
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 [2008] IEHC 309.  There were two objections to the designation of the CAO, based on 
specific aspects of the Minister’s (limited) power to prescribe.  The High Court found that the 
CAO was not a ‘body, organisation or group performing functions which previously stood 
vested in a body, organisation or group under public ownership or control’ (finding indeed that 
its functions were new, were not vested by law, and that the universities were not under public 
ownership or control), but that it was a ‘body, organisation or group on which functions in 
relation to the general public or a class of the general public stand conferred or permitted by 
any enactment or by any licence or authority given under any enactment’, as the exercise of 
its functions was permitted by authority under the university legislation. However caution is 
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Another case of note is the status of Network Rail (which as we saw earlier is 
not subject to the Human Rights Act) for the purposes of the Environmental 
Information Regulations.  The Regulations, similar in some regards to 
freedom of information provisions, and supervised by the same Information 
Commissioner, are also quite important to the citizen who would scrutinise 
the actions of powerful bodies.  The regulations implement a European 
directive (2003/4/EC), which in turn implements within the EU the Aarhus 
Convention.64  Under section 2(2) of the Regulations, public functions include 
any body that is covered by the Freedom of Information Act, but also ‘any 
other body or other person, that carries out functions of public 
administration’.  The Information Commissioner found that Network Rail was 
covered by this provision,65 but on appeal the Information Tribunal found that 
Network Rail did not carry out ‘functions of public administration’, or in the 
alternative that it did not carry out public functions (relying in part on 
Cameron).66  Again, the additional flexibility granted by the ability to include 
bodies other than those designated by Act of Parliament or statutory 
instrument inevitably lends itself to litigation.  It is also difficult to see what is 
gained from the term ‘functions of public administration’ (whether with the 
extremely narrow construction placed on it by the Tribunal or otherwise), 
particularly in the light of Lord Nicholl’s distinction between ‘governmental 
function’ and ‘public function’ for the purposes of section 6 of the HRA in 
Aston Cantlow.67  However, as it relatively close to the term of art included in 
both international convention and European directive (‘public administrative 




A practice has already developed of using the language of section 6 of the 
HRA in other statutes.  The Freedom of Information Act is one, as is the 
Disability Discrimination Act 2005 and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
2000.  The language is used in a slightly different context (providing for 
things like co-operation and information sharing with and delegation to ‘public 
authorities’) in the Education and Inspections Act 2006 and the Police and 
Justice Act 2006.  However, these statutes do not in every case provide that a 
                                                                                                                
necessary in drawing any conclusions from this summary as significant emphasis was placed 
by Murphy J on the Irish text which, under the Irish constitution, determines the matter when 
there is a conflict between it and the English text, as there was in a number of relevant 
places. 
64
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body subject to the HRA is similarly subject to the statute in question; 
instead, inclusion on a list is required to seal the deal in some situation, 
creating further sub-categories of public authorities.  So in the case of the 
Freedom of Information Act, the system of designation under section 5 can be 
seen as having two elements to it – i.e. it is a combination of a designation 
approach and a functional one.  Bodies must first be exercising relevant 
functions (with the statute using the same language as the Human Rights 
Act) in order to be designated; a designation of a body not captured by that 
definition will surely be challenged and quashed as ultra vires.  The Disability 
Discrimination Act, with respect to which it is unclear whether designation is 
necessary or not after Brown, even allows bodies to be excluded by regulation 
from the definition (again using HRA language) of public authority.  The Race 
Relations (Amendment) Act is slightly different again.  It is surely likely, 
though, that if this increasingly significant group of statutes uses the HRA test 
rather than the Datafin one (if there is a difference), then modifications to the 
HRA test (whether through judicial development or legislation along the lines 
proposed by the Joint Committee) must have a knock-on effect on the status 
of public authorities in the ‘statutory’ category. 
 
The curious phrase “person certain” may continue to be part of the problem.  
In Brown, it is noted by the Court that ‘the draftsman used the expression 
“person certain” to emphasise the fact that the public authority must be an 
identifiable natural or legal person’, contrasting it with the alternative word 
'person' as defined in the Interpretation Act, which is perhaps at the outer 
limits of plausible interpretation. 
 
It is also possible for bodies to be designated as possessing powers that 
would be commonly understood as pertaining in the first instance of public 
authorities, without defining them as such.  It is difficult to understand how 
certain bodies, such as RSLs, should enjoy the benefits of exercising public 
functions (such as the power to apply for an anti-social behaviour order 
pursuant to the Crime and Disorder Act)68 but not be subject to the 
obligations of such.   
 
Even when proposals for new legislation are put forward, though, there is 
what can only be understood as a creative ambiguity in the words of their 
proposers.  Most recently, when it was suggested in a White Paper that there 
be a new statutory duty along similar lines as the familiar equality duties to 
address social mobility / class questions,69 the language was that 
consideration would be given to “a new strategic duty on central departments 
and key public services” to address these issues: what is a central 
department, let alone a ‘key public service’, and who will decide? 
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 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 1A (inserted by s 61 of the Police Reform Act 2002). 
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 Cabinet Office, ‘New Opportunities: Fair chances for the future’ (Cm 7533, 2009). 
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Recent developments in self-regulation and co-regulation 
 
Co-regulation or self-regulation? 
 
Having considered the various types of control placed on public authorities, it 
is now appropriate to look to current developments in self-regulation, in order 
to assess whether those affected by the decisions of such bodies are given 
satisfactory rights of redress.  Indeed, while the various changes above were 
in progress, self-regulation too was being joined by a close cousin, ‘co-
regulation’, which is a favoured solution to many contemporary problems.  
The approach blends the independence and non-intervention of self-
regulation with limited oversight by established public authorities, and is 
increasingly encouraged by the European Commission and others.  Typically, 
co-regulation includes a legal connection (possibly though not necessarily 
statutory) between a non-state regulatory system and state regulation, 
discretionary power exercised by the non-state system, and the involvement 
of the bodies or persons being regulated in the process of regulation.  In fact, 
since the Companies Act 2006 (part 28), transposing provisions of the 
Takeovers Directive (2004/25/EC) came into force, it can be argued that 
Datafin’s Takeover Panel itself is in the co-regulation category, as its functions 
now have a clear statutory basis.  
 
However, even in co-regulation situations, where it would be thought that the 
issues of public functions would be a little more clear-cut, it is not always so.  
This issue arises in R (Siborurema) v Office of the Independent Adjudicator,70 
dealing with the regulatory system for student complaints envisaged in the 
Higher Education Act 2004.  The OIA was created by universities as a limited 
company without share capital in 2003, and subsequently recognised by the 
Secretary of State pursuant to the Act as the ‘designated operator’ for a 
student complaints scheme with effect from January 2005.  It argued that 
amenability to judicial review would hinder its role to ‘serve students and 
HEI’s cheaply and efficiently’,71 but the Court of Appeal rejected the 
argument, particularly in relation to whether the complaints scheme was 
within the terms of the authorising Act.   
 
This is of some importance in the context of the operation of the Office, 
which is a typical co-regulation scenario: a Minister can recognise the non-
governmental body if it is operating in accordance with a set of principles set 
out in the statute.  It is found that a correct reading of the Act shows that the 
designated operator would be performing a public function, making it 
different to institutions such as purely private arbitrators.72  The claim was 
rejected on the merits (with the scope for review appearing quite narrow), as 
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was a subsequent application73 and the OIA reports that there have been 13 
other applications where permission to apply was not granted.74  This is 
perhaps a satisfactory situation, and it is clear that the system is not self-
regulation based on contract (or something resembling contract), as students 
affected by its decisions are not party to any such contract, which (if relevant) 
is between the OIA and the subscribing universities and/or between the OIA 
and the state.  However, it remains troubling to observe that as far back as 
its first annual report, the OIA was reassuring the public that one of its two 
forms of accountability was the way in which its decisions ‘are constrained by 
the possibility of judicial review’ (the other form was the designation under 
the Higher Education Act, which could be revoked),75 while subsequently 
going to court in Siborurema with the argument that it should not be so 
constrained.  The OIA is also not subject to the Freedom of Information Act, 
though surely should be considered for inclusion in a future section 5 order. 
 
Killing Virgin Killer: the continuing power of self-regulation 
 
On December 5th 2008, Wikipedia disappeared.76 
 
It turned out that the reason for the site becoming inaccessible to most UK 
users was a system of filtering unknown to most Internet users, steered by 
the private-sector Internet Watch Foundation.  The most important aspect of 
the controversy, for our purposes, is that it promotes public discussion on the 
role of the IWF, which while a core issue in Internet law and policy, is still a 
relatively unknown one. The IWF is a private body that plays a role in the 
regulation of UK Internet access - not a statutory role but a self-regulatory 
role.  For those critical of Internet censorship, this is a particularly problem, as 
although the State has declined to intervene, transparency and accountability 
are also absent.   
 
The IWF has played a dual role in the control of alleged child pornography, 
sending takedown notices to hosts of UK-based content (though that task has 
been broadly completed with little or no such content said to remain or being 
newly published) and creating a blacklist of non-UK content which ISPs then 
proceed to block (usually by returning a page not found (404) error to a user 
who requests the page by entering the URL or clicking on a link) through 
systems such as Cleanfeed. 
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In this case, the problem arose in relation to a photograph77 of an album 
cover, the album being ‘Virgin Killer’ by The Scorpions. The image features a 
(partially obscured) photograph of a naked female child, although the initial 
listing blocked the page (i.e. text and photo) rather than the image alone.  
The image, a controversial one to begin with, was also available on various 
websites, and the album itself, including in some cases the original cover, is 
available on the second-hand market; an alternative version with a less 
objectionable cover was also issued.  The situation was complicated by the 
interaction between the technological configuration of the ISP blocking and 
Wikipedia itself, which meant that, in practice, many UK users could not edit 
any pages on Wikipedia while the blocking continued.  
 
The IWF issued a number of statements,78 and also gave interviews to the UK 
media; for example, the IWF spokesperson concluded a discussion on BBC 
Radio 4’s Today programme with “We apply the Protection of Children Act 
and the UK sentencing guidelines”. The difficulty here is apparent, in that 
there is no clear line of legal authority between the Act, the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and the IWF.  In particular, there is a limited right of appeal 
within the IWF,79 and its discussions are broadly effective, from the point of 
view of domestic Internet users (i.e. an IWF decision means, in practice, that 
a page cannot be accessed by a user without special skill).   
 
With that in mind, given the suggestion that the system could be rolled out 
for other types of content (suicide websites, promotion of terrorism), or used 
as a policing tool, or used in IP enforcement, it is necessary to address these 
issues before any extension is even considered.  Already, public authorities 
such as the Ministry of Justice recommend that reports of images covered by 
the new ‘extreme pornography’ offence80 be sent to the IWF rather than the 
police.81 
 
Is an IWF decision– or an ISP action on the basis of such a decision – subject 
to judicial oversight of any sort?  The IWF has itself asserted that it is subject 
to the Human Rights Act, though at the level of a Board meeting,82 and not 
tested in court.  The ISPs have made no such concession, nor would they be 
likely to.83  There is the added dimension that testing the grounds of review 
through a test case is far from likely – seeking a legal remedy for the blocking 
of access to a non-UK webpage (which in many cases is not officially marked 
as blocked, but is merely unreachable through what looks like a computer 
error) allegedly containing material that generally condemned by society and 
subject to heavy legal penalties is not an everyday event.  An expansion in 
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the IWF’s role, particularly in the context of the extreme pornography offence 
(which was subject to vocal criticism from a number of corners), may in fact 
bring these issues to the forefront after all.  There does appear to be life in 





The statutory designation approach brings with it the advantage of certainty 
and allows all parties to plan their activities (whether in relation to compliance 
with the law by the said body or use of the law by a citizen).  The functional 
approach allows applicants to seek a remedy against a body even if such was 
not directly contemplated by Government, or indeed where a strategic 
decision is taken to avoid that body being held to account.  It is clear that it 
will not be possible to gather all the remedies of traditional judicial review, 
the Human Rights Act and the new statutory provisions into one approach.  
Therefore, what may be the best solution for the time being is to pursue 
some measure of a joined-up approach, where (known) information on all 
possible remedies is easy to access, and an honest and open discussion takes 
place at the inception of any new body or function with regard to its legal 
status.  Special caution is necessary in the situation where a public function is 
performed by a party not subject to duties such as freedom of information 
and equality, particularly where there is a requirement of action on the part of 
Parliament or a Minister, that a two-tier situation does not develop – if for 
example a broad definition of public authority were to be adopted by the 
courts and by Parliament, and it applied to both judicial review and the HRA, 
there would still be a division – perhaps an unsustainable one - between 
those bodies subject to judicial review and the HRA but not the statutory 
provisions and those subject to all three.  This is unquestionably important in 
the case of self-regulatory bodies, which have come within the scrutiny of the 
courts under protest (or in the case of the Press Complaints Commission, 
continue to dodge that bullet quite elegantly), but are rarely subject to other 
obligations.  It is disappointing to note that there is not yet a culture of 
examining the potential public authority/public function status of a self-
regulatory or co-regulatory body as part of the process of examining the most 
appropriate approach.84 
 
The approach taken by Parliament with respect to the partial abrogation of YL 
in the Health and Social Care Act has little to offer, as it leaves a controversial 
general principle that restricts the functional approach intact while effectively 
engaging in statutory designation for a limited class of functions.  Greater 
clarity on the part of the courts is needed as to the relationship between the 
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various heads of review, as if discretion is to stay with us, the inconsistent 
findings as to the separate or merged public function tests for judicial review 
and HRA claims clouds the exercise of this discretion perhaps beyond 
redemption.  There is no overwhelming requirement for the threshold 
requirements being the same – judicial review and HRA duties perform 
separate functions and there are clearly matters which would be the subject 
of one but not the other.  There is similarly no objection in principle to a 
single test, and such a test would have the advantage of providing some 
stability for all concerned.  Without some action, though, inconsistent 
application and evasive tactics mean that even in a supposedly litigious and 
over-regulated society – “this whole health and safety, Human Rights Act 
culture [that] has infected every part of our life”,85 there may still be some 
Alsatias in England.86  
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 ‘There must be no Alsatia in England where the King's writ does not run’: Czarnikow v 
Roth, Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478, 488 (Scrutton LJ), quoted by Donaldson MR in Datafin 
827. 
